“That the predicate is a verb, and that the verb is irreducible to the copula and to the attribute, mark the very basis of the Leibnizian conception of the event. In the first place the event is deemed worthy of being raised to the state of a concept: the Stoics accomplished this by making the event neither an attribute nor a quality, but the incorporal predicate of a subject of the proposition (not ‘the tree is green.” but ‘the tree greens …’). They conclude that the proposition stated a ‘manner of being’ of the thing, an ‘aspect’ that exceeded the Aristotelian alternative, essence-accident: for the verb ‘to be’ they substitute ‘to follow,’ and they put manner in the place of essence. Then Leibniz implemented the second great logic of the event: the world itself is an event and, as an incorporeal (= virtual) predicate, the world must be included in every subject as a basis from which each one extracts the manners that correspond to its point of view (aspects). The world is predication itself, manners being the particular predicates, and the subject, what goes from one predicate to another as if from one aspect of the world to another. The coupling basis-manners disenfranchises form or essence: Leibniz makes it the mark of his philosophy. The Stoics and Leibniz invent a mannerism that is opposed to the essentialism first of Aristotle and then of Descartes. Mannerism as a composite of the Baroque is inherited from a Stoic mannerism that is now extended to the cosmos. A third great logic of the event will come with Whitehead.”
Gilles Deleuze, The Fold, p 60-61