Occurring Qualities and Philosophies of Relevance

What if there are only ‘occurent qualities’? I don’t mean the obvious primary/secondary qualities distinction, but that the composition of matter and energy are entirely compositional and contingent. As energy cannot be destroyed, only transformed, then this or that composition of matter and energy is continually being transformed (ie entropy) since the beginning of the universe. The given composition of anything would therefore be a particular contingent composition of matter and energy. Isn’t this what meillassoux is getting at with his hyper-chaos (or, as I have always understood it, Guattari’s chaosmos)?

I’d argue this is a far harder task for any OOP: rather than simply ‘withdrawing’, when observed, the composition of the matter and energy change, always! Or is OOP is describing an anthropomorphic consistency in the composition of matter and energy as ‘objects’? Unless one wants to argue for an absolute non-relationism, and therefore avoid a recomposition of matter and energy, etc. I can’t really see how this can be avoided.

Above is another comment to Levi’s post about the notion of objects withdrawing. An easy way it can be avoided is following Deleuze’s argument in Difference and Repetition regarding differentiation, does the recomposition catalysed by observation of any composition of matter and energy beyond the sub/atomic scale make a lick difference? No… Well at least not to human perception and our perception of a (correlationist) difference.

I think I’ll call this the thermodynamic critique.